Expected Dynamics of an Imitation Model in 2x2 Symmetric Games
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The figure shows the actual (in blue) and expected (in black) proportion of 
-strategists in a population of 
individuals who, at each iteration (of time length 
), are randomly matched in pairs to play a symmetric 2×2 game. The two possible actions (or pure strategies) in the game are labeled and 
. Thus, each individual in the population is either an -strategist or a -strategist. The payoffs of the game are 
, 
, 
, and 
(parameters), where, for instance, denotes the payoff obtained by an -strategist when he plays with a -strategist.
Contributed by: Luis R. Izquierdo and Segismundo S. Izquierdo (May 2010)
Open content licensed under CC BY-NC-SA
Snapshots
Details
The first three Snapshots show the Hawk-Dove game in a population of 
individuals ( denotes the Hawk strategy and denotes the Dove strategy).
Snapshot 1: 
Snapshot 2: 
Snapshot 3: 
The last three Snapshots show the Prisoner's Dilemma game in a population of individuals ( denotes the cooperative strategy and denotes the defective strategy).
Snapshot 4:
Snapshot 5:
Snapshot 6:
Reference
[1] S. S. Izquierdo and L. R. Izquierdo, "Stochastic Approximation to Understand Simple Simulation Models," Journal of Statistical Physics, Dec 2012. dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10955-012-0654-z. Download preprint.
Permanent Citation
Expected Dynamics of an Intra-Population Imitation Model for Inter-Population 2x2 Symmetric Games
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An Imitation Model for 2x2 Symmetric Games
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An Intra-Population Imitation Model for Inter-Population 2x2 Symmetric Games
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Expected Dynamics of an Imitation Model in the Hawk-Dove Game
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Mixing and Infection in a Two-Group SIS Model
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Expected Dynamics of an Intra-Population Imitation Model in the Two-Population Hawk-Dove Game
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An Intra-Population Imitation Model in the Two-Population Hawk-Dove Game
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Expected Dynamics of an Imitation Model in the Hawk-Dove Game
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An Imitation Model in the Hawk-Dove Game
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Expected Motion in 2x2 Symmetric Games Played by Reinforcement Learners
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Expected Dynamics of an Imitation Model in 2x2 Symmetric Games
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An Intra-Population Imitation Model for Inter-Population 2x2 Symmetric Games
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An Imitation Model for 2x2 Symmetric Games
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